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INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 - Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of Brazil regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology

Information Circular

INFCIRC
/254/Rev.9/Part 1
a
Date: 7 November 2007
General Distribution
Original: English







Communication Received from the Permanent
Mission of Brazil regarding Certain Member
States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology





1.
The Agency has received a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Brazil, dated
22 March 2007, in which it requests that the Agency circulate to all Member States a letter of
12 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Ambassador José Artur Denot
Medeiros, to the Director General, on behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,
providing further information on those Governments Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers
b
.
.

2.
In the light of the wish expressed in the above-mentioned Note Verbale, the text of the Note
Verbale, as well as the letter and attachment thereto, are hereby reproduced for the information of all
Member States.
__________________________________________________________________________________
a
INFCIRC/254/Part 2, as amended, contains Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials,
Software and Related Technology
b
The European Commission participates as an observer.

INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1
November 2007

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GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS


1. The following fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to
nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State and, in the case
of controls on retransfer, to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have
defined an export trigger list.

Prohibition on nuclear explosives

2. Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger
list only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses
which would result in any nuclear explosive device.

Physical protection

3. (a) All nuclear materials and facilities identified by the agreed trigger list should be
placed under effective physical protection to prevent unauthorized use and handling.
The levels of physical protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials,
equipment and facilities, have been agreed by the suppliers, taking account of
international recommendations.

(b) The implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the
responsibility of the Government of that country. However, in order to implement the
terms agreed upon amongst suppliers, the levels of physical protection on which these
measures have to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and
recipient.

(c) In each case special arrangements should be made for a clear definition of
responsibilities for the transport of trigger list items.

Safeguards

4. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear
weapon State only when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with
the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable
material in its current and future peaceful activities. Suppliers should authorize such
transfers only upon formal governmental assurances from the recipient that:

if the above-mentioned agreement should be terminated the recipient will bring
into force an agreement with the IAEA based on existing IAEA model safeguards
agreements requiring the application of safeguards on all trigger list items or
related technology transferred by the supplier or processed, or produced or used in
connection with such transfers; and



if the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible,
the supplier and recipient should elaborate appropriate verification measures. If
the recipient does not accept these measures, it should allow at the request of the
supplier the restitution of transferred and derived trigger list items.
INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1
November 2007
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(b) Transfers covered by paragraph 4 (a) to a non-nuclear-weapon State without such a
safeguards agreement should be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are
deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards are
applied to those facilities. Suppliers should inform and, if appropriate, consult in the
event that they intend to authorize or to deny such transfers.

(c) The policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b) does not apply to agreements or
contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992. In case of countries that have adhered
or will adhere to INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1 later than April 3, 1992, the policy only
applies to agreements (to be) drawn up after their date of adherence.

(d) Under agreements to which the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) does not apply
(see paragraphs 4 (b) and (c)) suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related
technology only when covered by IAEA safeguards with duration and coverage
provisions in conformity with IAEA doc. GOV/1621. However, suppliers undertake to
strive for the earliest possible implementation of the policy referred to in paragraph 4
(a) under such agreements.

(e) Suppliers reserve the right to apply additional conditions of supply as a matter of
national policy.

5. Suppliers will jointly reconsider their common safeguards requirements, whenever
appropriate.

Special controls on sensitive exports

6. Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and
material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If enrichment or
reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should
encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement
and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should
also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational
regional fuel cycle centres.

Special controls on export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology

7. For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or technology therefor, the recipient nation should
agree that neither the transferred facility, nor any facility based on such technology, will
be designed or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium without
the consent of the supplier nation, of which the IAEA should be advised.

Controls on supplied or derived material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices

8. Suppliers should, in order to advance the objectives of these guidelines and to provide
opportunities further to reduce the risks of proliferation, include, whenever appropriate
and practicable, in agreements on supply of nuclear materials or of facilities which
produce material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
provisions calling for mutual agreement between the supplier and the recipient on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1
November 2007

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arrangements for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use, transfer or retransfer of any
material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices involved.

Controls on retransfer

9. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology only upon the
recipients assurance that in the case of:

(1)

retransfer of such items or related technology,

or

(2)

transfer of trigger list items derived from facilities originally transferred by the
supplier, or with the help of equipment or technology originally transferred by the
supplier;


the recipient of the retransfer or transfer will have provided the same assurances as

those required by the supplier for the original transfer.

(b) In addition the suppliers consent should be required for:

(1) any retransfer of trigger list items or related technology and any transfer referred
to under paragraph 9(a) (2) from any State which does not require full scope
safeguards, in accordance with paragraph 4(a) of these Guidelines, as a condition
of supply;

(2) any retran