ize=-1 color=black>Yahoo! is not affiliated with the authors of this page or responsible for its content.
June 2, 2003
June 2, 2003
J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968
SUBJECT:
COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 50-397/03-02
Dear Mr. Parrish:
On March 20, 2003, the NRC completed the onsite portion of the subject inspection at your
Columbia Generating Station. Review of additional documentation provided to the NRC
subsequent to the onsite inspection was performed from March 31 through April 15, 2003. The
enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with Mr. Scott
Oxenford, and other members of your staff on April 22, 2003.
This triennial fire protection inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they
relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the
conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected
examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews
with personnel.
During the inspection, an apparent violation of NRC requirements was identified regarding the
vulnerability of safe shutdown equipment to fire induced multiple spurious actuations. These
circuit vulnerabilities could, under certain postulated fire scenarios, adversely affect the ability to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the facility. It is the NRCs understanding that you do
not consider these vulnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. In order to allow the
industry to develop an acceptable approach to resolving this issue, that the NRC can endorse,
the NRC will defer any enforcement action relative to these matters while the staff evaluates
Nuclear Energy Institutes proposed resolution methodology. In addition, this will provide you
time to implement the resolution methodology, once approved, since you took compensatory
measures for the identified vulnerabilities.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified two findings whose final
significance has not yet been determined under the risk significance determination process, but
is known to be at least Green (very low safety significance). These findings are being treated
as unresolved items, pending determination of their significance. These unresolved items are
described in the subject inspection report. In addition, the NRC identified a finding that had
very low safety significance (Green). This finding is being treated as a noncited violation,
consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The noncited violation is described in Energy Northwest
-2-
the subject inspection report and was not cited because of very low safety significance and that
adequate compensatory measures were implemented. If you contest the violation or
significance of the noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the
Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza
Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
Columbia Generating Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket:
50-397
License:
NPF-21
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-397/03-02
cc w/enclosure:
Rodney Webring (Mail Drop PE04)
Vice President, Nuclear Generation
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Albert E. Mouncer (Mail Drop PE01)
Vice President, Corporate Services/
General Counsel/CFO
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Energy Northwest
-3-
Chairman
Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
P.O. Box 43172
Olympia, Washington 98504-3172
Douglas W. Coleman (Mail Drop PE20)
Manager, Performance Assessment
and Regulatory Programs
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Christina L. Perino (Mail Drop PE20)
Manager, Licensing
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Chairman
Benton County Board of Commissioners
P.O. Box 190
Prosser, Washington 99350-0190
Dale K. Atkinson (Mail Drop PE08)
Vice President, Technical Services
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Thomas C. Poindexter, Esq.
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
Bob Nichols
Executive Policy Division
Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 43113
Olympia, Washington 98504-3113
Lynn Albin
Washington State Department of Health
P.O. Box 7827
Olympia, WA 98504-7827 Energy Northwest
-4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (EWM)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
Senior Resident Inspector (GDR)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RITS Coordinator (NBH)
Scott Morris (SAM1)
Columbia Site Secretary (LEF1)
Dale Thatcher (DFT)
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
NCR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
William Dean (BYD)
ADAMS: G Yes
G No Initials: ______
G Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available
G Sensitive G Non-Sensitive
R:\_COL\2003\COL2003-02rp-rpm.wpd
RIV:DRS/EMB
EMB
RIV:SRI:DRP/E C:EMB
C:DRP/E
C:EMB
RPMullikin/lmb
RLNease
GDReplogle
CSMarschall
WBJones
CSMarschall
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/ E
/RA/
/RA/ GR for /RA/
05/15/03
5/19/03
05/13/03
06/02/03
06/02/03
06/02/03
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket:
50-397
License:
NPF-21
Report:
50-397/03-02
Licensee:
Energy Northwest
Facility:
Columbia Generating Station
Location:
Richland, Washington
Dates:
March 10 through April 15, 2003
Lead Inspector:
R. P. Mullikin, Senior Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Inspectors:
R. L. Nease, Senior Reactor Inspector
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
G. D. Replogle, Senior Resident Inspector
Project Branch E
Approved By:
Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety -2-
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR05000397/2003-02; Energy Northwest; 3/10-20/2003 and 3/31/2003 through 4/15/2003;
Columbia Generating Station, Triennial Fire Protection Inspection
The inspection was conducted by two regional inspectors and one senior resident inspector.
The inspection identified one green finding and two unresolved item which were violations of
NRC regulatory requirements. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color
(green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination
Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be
"green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-
1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
Inspector Identified Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
C
TBD. The inspectors identified a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d (inadequate
procedure) because Procedure ABN-CR-EVAC, Control Room Evacuation and Remote
Cooldown, failed to provide adequate post-fire direction to: (1) assure suppression pool
temperatures did not increase above residual heat removal pump temperature limits
following depressurization; and (2) assure adequate core cooling with one safety relief
valve stuck open.
This finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination. This
finding is greater than minor because it impacts the mitigating systems cornerstone and
affects the ability of the low pressure coolant injection system to provide adequate core
cooling to prevent core damage. This finding was determined to have potential safety
significance greater than very low significance because of the lack of credited systems
to mitigate the effects of a control room fire. (Section 1R05.3)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
C
TBD. The inspectors identified a violation of License Condition 2.C(14) for the failure to
take appropriate corrective measures to address a condition adverse to quality affecting
the low pressure coolant injection system. During a control room fire, the system has
been vulnerable to a water hammer since at least 1997 due to a leaking check valve in
Train B of the residual heat removal system. The licensee took over five years to
identify the condition and failed to specify appropriate corrective measures to promptly
fix