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Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) - Report of Investigation Surface Nonmetal Mine (Dimension stone) Fatal Powered Haualge Accident Occuring May 19, 2006 - #10
MAI-2006-10

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health


REPORT OF INVESTIGATION


Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Construction Sand and Gravel)


Fatal Electrical Accident
May 19, 2006


Kinder Sand Company LLC
Kinder Plant
Kinder, Allen Parish, Louisiana
Mine ID No. 16-00555




Investigators

Ralph Rodriguez
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Jerry Y. Anguiano
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Stephen B. Dubina
Electronics Engineer



Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
South Central District
1100 Commerce Street, Room 462
Dallas, Texas 75242-0499
Edward E. Lopez, District Manager






OVERVIEW

On May 19, 2006, Joseph Kowarsch, self-employed electrician, age 77, was fatally injured when
he contacted an energized electrical circuit. He was testing a motor before installing it on a
screen.

The accident occurred because safe operating procedures were not implemented to ensure that
the electrical circuit was de-energized, locked out, tagged, and tested prior to performing work
on the circuit.


GENERAL INFORMATION

Kinder Plant, a dredging operation owned and operated by Kinder Sand Company, LLC, was
located about 5 miles west of Kinder, Allen Parish, Louisiana. The principal operating official
was M. D. Bryant, president. The mine operated one 10-hour shift, 5-6 days per week. Total
employment was 17 persons.

Sand was dredged from a 15-acre pond and pumped to an on-site plant where it was screened,
washed, dewatered, and dried. Finished products were sold in bulk and in 50-pound bags.

The last regular inspection at this operation was completed on May 18, 2006.


DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On the day of the accident, Joseph Kowarsch (victim) arrived at the mine at 2:15 p.m. Dennis
Cormier, assistant plant manager, had called Kowarsch at home to request his services as a
contract electrician at the mine.

Kinder had installed a used dewatering screen at the plant on May 18, 2006. The screen was
powered by two 7.5-horsepower motors, one mounted on the north side of the screen and one on
the south side of the screen. Wayne Bell, plant manager, connected the screen motors on May 19
and attempted to start them. However, the north motor caused the circuit breaker to trip.
Several attempts were made to start the motor before Bell decided to call an outside electrician.

Curtis Morgan, a contract electrician with whom Kinder contracts on a regular basis, was not
available that day. Cormier mentioned to Bell that Kowarsch had previously given him a
business card and might be available. Bell told Cormier to contact Kowarsch.

After arriving at the mine, Kowarsch checked the north and south motors with a volt meter and
discovered that the north motor was damaged. Bell sent Donnie Corkran, operations manager, to
Elton, Louisiana to get a new motor while Paul Oliver, dredge operator, and Brandon Lafleur,
laborer, assisted Kowarsch with removal of the damaged motor.

The damaged motor was placed near the plant electrical building. Kowarsch decided to retest the
damaged motor to verify it was unusable while he waited for another motor to arrive. He
attached a 21-foot length of white cable from the damaged motor to the motor control module in
the electrical building. Kowarsch indicated that the motor was bad and removed the cable from
the motor. About that time, Corkran returned from Elton with two new motors.

Kowarsch indicated to Bell that he wanted to test one of the new motors before installing it.
About that time, Bell went to his office to make a phone call. The motor was placed on the
tailgate of the Toyota pickup truck that Corkran had been driving. Kowarsch connected the
white cable to the motor and went into the electrical building.


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Kowarsch evidently turned on the power at that time because Lafleur and Oliver said the motor
was humming and the motor shaft was turning slowly. Kowarsch came to the electrical building
door and said it was single phasing, went back inside, and the motor stopped humming. He
came back outside, disconnected the white cable from the motor, and said he wanted to check the
(motor) wiring.

Kowarsch went back into the electrical building and returned with a volt meter. After checking
the motor leads, Kowarsch commented again that it was single phasing. He then went back
inside the electrical building and came out again.

About 4:55 p.m., Bell and Corkran returned to the tail gate of the pickup truck and saw that
Kowarsch was reading the wiring instructions on the inside of the motor cover (weather head).
Kowarsch told Bell he needed to make some changes to the motor leads.

After regrouping the motor leads, Kowarsch said he was ready to reconnect the white cable to
the motor. Kowarsch reached down to the ground and picked up the white cable with one hand
then grasped the bare conductors with his other hand. He made a noise, bent over, and fell
against the tailgate of the pickup.

Bell positioned himself behind Kowarsch and jerked the white cable out of his hands. Kowarsch
then fell to the ground on his backside. Oliver ran inside the electrical building and shut off the
power at the circuit breaker.

Corkran brushed the backside of his hand against Kowarschs body to verify that he was not
energized then instructed Bell to get help while he, Lafleur and Stephen Chaney, laborer, began
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Bell went to the break room and called for emergency
medical services (EMS), returned with a protective barrier from a first-aid kit and assisted the
others with CPR. EMS arrived about 5:15 p.m. and transported Kowarsch to a local hospital,
where he was pronounced dead.


INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT

MSHA was notified at 5:15 p.m. on the day of the accident by a telephone call from Wayne Bell
to Mitchell Adams, assistant district manager. An investigation was started the next day. An
order was issued pursuant to section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of miners. An
accident investigation team from MSHA traveled to the mine, made a physical inspection of the
accident scene, interviewed employees, and reviewed documents and work procedures relevant
to the accident. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management and
employees.


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DISCUSSION

Location of the Accident
The accident occurred about 10 feet from the door of the plant electrical building. The area was
flat and dry. The weather was clear and sunny. The victim was standing on a concrete pad.

Motor
The motor being tested was rated 7.5-horsepower and was to have been installed on a Deister
vibrating (dewatering) screen. It had nine external lead wires connected to the internal electrical
fields. Connecting each phase wire of the incoming power to a correct delta grouping of three
motor leads would have resulted in the motor operating at 230 volts. Similarly, connecting each
phase wire of the incoming power to one correct motor lead each would have resulted in the
motor operating at 460 volts. Connecting the incoming phase wires to any other grouping of the
motor leads would have resulted in some fault condition for the motor such as single phasing.

Motor Control Module
The motor control module was located in the plant electrical building and contained a motor
starter, circuit breaker, and other control circuitry. The motor starter was a NEMA size #1 with
heater strips that were sized appropriately. The control circuit for the motor starter operated at
120 volts, single phase.

The motor starter controls, located in the plant control building, were in the OFF position at the
time of the accident. However, the contacts in the C-phase circuit of the motor starter were fused
together when inspected. Even though it was not possible to determine when this defect
occurred, investigators believe the contacts fused together while Kowarsch was testing the new
motor and that this condition contributed to the accident.

The circuit breaker was a 30-ampere, thermal magnetic type with an instantaneous trip adjusted
to the maximum 350 amperes. Since the motor nameplate rating was 9.3 amperes at 460 volts,
the instantaneous trip should have been set no higher than 65 amperes, which was approximately
700 percent of the rated full-load current of 9.3 amperes. Although this condition constituted a
violation of a mandatory safety standard, it did not contribute to the accident and was cited
separately.

White Cable
The white cable used to test the damaged motor and the new motor was a 21-foot section of
Romex type cable that was cut on-site from a 100-foot