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Moral Inertia 1
Moral Inertia
*
1. Introduction: Deflection
The focus of this paper will be scenarios of deflection, i.e. scenarios where an agent interferes
with an ongoing process (a process already in motion) by making it depart from its preset
path and take a different path. Cases with this structure have shown to be of significant
interest to both metaphysics and ethics. In metaphysics, deflection scenarios have been a
recent focus of investigation by philosophers working in the metaphysics of causation. For
some deflection scenariostemporary deflections of processes, where the processes then
resume their initial pathsuggest that it is possible to affect the causal route to an outcome
without causing the outcome (say, I temporarily divert a missile, which then resumes its
original path and reaches its destination all the same; it seems that the deflection doesnt cause
the outcome). The challenge, then, is to say what distinguishes those arguably non-causal
deflection structures from other structures that are arguably causal (in particular,
preemption scenarios, such as the launching of a new threat that goes to completion before
an old threat does).
1
In ethics, deflection cases are the source of intriguing trolley puzzles,
where the challenge is to explain the moral difference that we see between two different kinds
of scenario, one of which is a deflection scenario. For example, if a runaway train is
threatening to kill five workmen on the tracks, it seems permissible to switch the train onto a
side track where only one man is working. On the other hand, it doesnt seem permissible to

*
I would like to thank the audiences at the 2007 Bellingham Philosophy Conference, the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the University of Notre Dame, and Northern Illinois University, for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to Juan Comesaña and to my commentators at the
Bellingham conference, Anne Barhill and Peter Graham.
1
See, e.g., Paul (2000), Yablo (2002), and Sartorio (2005). 2
throw a person in front of the train, even if its to prevent the train from killing the five people
on the tracks.
2
In this paper I discuss another role played by deflection scenarios in ethics. I argue
that certain deflection scenarios suggest that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral
pressure to leave things as is, in other words, to fail to intervene. I call this phenomenon
moral inertia.
3
I argue that moral inertia takes two main forms. The first form consists in strict
prohibitions against interventions (discussed in section 2), and the second form consists in
constraints or limitations on interventions (discussed in section 3). Both of these
manifestations of moral inertia involve deflection scenarios where an ongoing process that
was bound to harm or benefit some people can be diverted onto other people, thus changing
who is benefited or harmed.
Moral inertia is likely to be connected to the thesis that there is a moral difference
between killing and letting die, or between doing and allowing harm. I discuss the relation
between moral inertia and the killing/letting die distinction in connection with each of the two
manifestations of moral inertia, in sections 2 and 3.
Note that the main thesis of this paper is a claim about that to which we are ordinarily
committed given our intuitions about certain scenarios, not a rational defense of such
intuitions. However, there is a particular objection to the rational defensibility of moral inertia
that has to do with the intelligibility of the concept of deflection in general. In section 4 I
consider this objection and I explain how it might be possible to address it by appeal to the

2
See Thomson (1976).
3
Following Thomsons usage in her (1976) (Thomson, as well see, rejects the existence of moral inertia). This
concept of moral inertia ought not to be confused with a different, quite common usage of the expression: the
moral blindness to evils generated by habit. 3
role played by deflection in metaphysics, which was discussed at the beginning of this
section.
2. First manifestation: Prohibitions on interventions
2.1. Malm and killing versus letting die
The first kind of pressure to leave things as is arises in deflection scenarios of the following
kind: a process that is already in motion is about to harm or benefit one person, and you can
deflect it so that another person is harmed or benefited instead. In particular, the same number
of deaths would result from your intervening or not intervening, but different people would
die in each case. In this important respect, these cases are different from typical trolley
scenarios, where deflecting an ongoing threat would result in fewer deaths.
Heidi Malm has offered deflection cases of this kind as an argument for the moral
relevance of the (ordinary) killing/letting die distinction.
4
Although my focus here is the
distinction between intervening and failing to intervene, not the distinction between killing
and letting die, the two distinctions seem to be tightly connected to each other. At least
generally, we think that an agent merely lets someone die when there is a deadly process
already in motion and the agent fails to intervene or interfere with it. By contrast, we think
that an agent kills someone when he intervenes in a way that results in someones death,
either by starting a new threat to the person or by helping to sustain an already existing threat.
I wont try to decide the issue of whether the two distinctions completely overlap, or whether

4
Malm (1989). The thesis that she argues for is only that sometimes there is a moral difference between killing
and letting die even if all other things are equal (although there are other cases where other things are equal and
there is no difference between killing and letting die). As indicated, Malms focus is the ordinary distinction
between killing and letting die; she doesnt attempt to give a theoretical account of the distinction. Similarly, my
focus is the ordinary distinction between intervening and failing to intervene. 4
there are cases in which they come apart. It seems to me that Malms argument can be seen as
an argument for moral inertia, even if its also an argument for the moral significance of
killing versus letting die. In fact, if, as suggested, the killing/letting die distinction rests on the
distinction between intervening and failing to intervene, it seems preferable to regard the
argument as an argument for moral inertia than as an argument for the moral significance of
the killing/letting die distinction. (Also, see section 3 below for a possible reason to think that
the thesis of moral inertia has a broader scope than the thesis about killing and letting die.) In
what follows I use killing versus letting die and intervening versus failing to intervene
interchangeably, unless I explicitly indicate otherwise.
To my mind, deflection scenarios provide the strongest possible case for the moral
significance of the killing/letting die distinction. In what follows I make use of one of Malms
examples and I endorse Malms reasoning about it. I believe, however, that Malm fails to
recognize (or sufficiently emphasize) the important role that deflection plays in the argument.
By contrast, I will argue that deflection plays a key roleactually, a twofold role. As we will
see, it is in virtue of this double role that deflection scenarios provide the strongest possible
case for the moral significance of the killing/letting die distinction.
5
Consider a deflection scenario involving an evil or threat:
Runaway Train: A runaway train is hurtling down the tracks when it reaches a switch.
X was walking on the left-hand track when his foot got stuck, and the same happened

5
There are other important differences between my proposal and Malms, which will be apparent later (see, in
particular, n. 18 below). 5
to Y on the right-hand track. The switch is originally set for the left-hand track. You
could flip the switch and divert the train to the right-hand track.
6
And here is a deflection case involving a good:
Floating Drug: Two people, X and Y, need a certain drug to survive. X, Y, and a
bottle with a dose of the drug are in the water, and the bottle starts drifting towards X.
You could alter its course and deflect it to Y.
7
My intuition about these cases is clear: other things being equal, you ought not flip the
switch in Runaway Train and you ought not deflect the drug in Floatin