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Prospects for Iraqs Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive
Prospects for Iraqs Stability:
Some Security Progress but
Political Reconciliation Elusive

Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraqs
Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead







August 2007


O
FFICE OF THE
D
IRECTOR OF
N
ATIONAL
I
NTELLIGENCE



The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and
acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:

Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as
present results.


N
ATIONAL
I
NTELLIGENCE
C
OUNCIL

Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge
between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on
critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community
collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished,
and unbiased information. Its primary functions are to:
Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security
concerns.
Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to
task the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sectorand use
alternative analyses and new analytic toolsto broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.

N
ATIONAL
I
NTELLIGENCE
E
STIMATES AND THE
NIE

P
ROCESS


National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Communitys (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
estimativethat is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.

The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders, and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). Before an NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer is responsible
for producing a concept paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates it throughout
the Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions,
determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or
more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to
critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the
relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE.
Working with their Agencies, representatives also assign the level of confidence they have
in key judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the
National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any
that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.

All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.

The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last two years the IC has:

Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Director of CIA, as the National HUMINT Manager, as
well as the Directors of NSA, NGA, and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now
required to submit formal assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and
overall credibility of their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.



Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as we judge and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to display them prominently in the Key Judgments.



S c o p e N o t e

This assessment updates the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq
entitled, Prospects for Iraqs Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead; it has been prepared at
the direction of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a request from the
National Security Council. It provides the Intelligence Communitys analysis of the status
of the critical factors identified in the January Estimate that are driving Iraqs security and
political trajectory. Using the January Estimate as a baseline, this update examines the
prospects for progress on the security and national reconciliation fronts over the next six to
12 months.

Analytic Caution: Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the
increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly
and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional
variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more
distinctfor example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns
of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on
only a short period of the Iraqi conflictthe last six monthsand in circumscribed
areasprimarily the central provinces, which contain the center of gravity for Iraqs
security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more
information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq,
combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties
are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error. These issues,
combined with the challenges of acquiring accurate data on trends in violence and
continued gaps in our information about levels of violence and political trends in areas of
Iraq without a substantial Coalition presence and where Intelligence Community collectors
have difficulty operating, heighten our caution. Nonetheless, we stand by these judgments
as our best collective assessment of security and political conditions in Iraq today and as
likely to unfold during the next six to12 months.
H
OW
T
HIS
E
STIMATE
W
AS
P
RODUCED



This Estimate followed the standard process for producing National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs), including a thorough review of sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, and
consideration of alternative analysis. The NIC circulated a terms of reference (TOR) for
the Estimate to IC agencies for review. Analysts from throughout the Community
contributed to the draft. A draft was submitted to Intelligence Community (IC) officers in
advance of coordination meetings. The National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC
collection officers reviewed the text for the reliability and proper use of the sourcing. As
part of the normal coordination process, analysts had the opportunity and were encouraged
to register dissents and provide alternative analysis. The National Intelligence Board,
composed of the he