filiated with the authors of this page or responsible for its content.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment




Operation Iraqi Freedom:
A First-Blush Assessment

Andrew F. Krepinevich























































1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 912
Washington, DC 20036


Operation Iraqi Freedom:
A First-Blush Assessment

by

Andrew F. Krepinevich







Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
2003


ABOUT

THE

CENTER

FOR

STRATEGIC

AND

BUDGETARY

ASSESSMENTS
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent public policy
research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and
investment strategies for the 21st century. CSBAs analytic-based research makes clear the
inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and
efficient defense, and the need to transform the US military in light of the emerging military
revolution.
CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundation, corporate and
individual grants and contributions, and government contracts.



1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW
Suite 912
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 331-7990
http://www.csbaonline.org





A
CKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Steven Kosiak, Robert Martinage, Michael Vickers and Barry
Watts, who reviewed several drafts of this report. Their comments and suggestions proved
invaluable. Critical research assistance was provided by Todd Lowery. His support in chasing
down numerous sources and confirming critical facts proved indispensable. Alane Kochems did
a fine job editing and proofing the final report draft, while Alise Frye graciously helped craft the
reports executive summary. I am most grateful for their encouragement and support. Naturally,
however, the opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report are the sole responsibility
of the author.





C
ONTENTS

E
XECUTIVE
S
UMMARY
..........................................................................................................
I

I.

I
NTRODUCTION
........................................................................................................ 1

II.

S
TRATEGIC
I
MPLICATIONS
......................................................................................... 5

There Is No International Consensus Regarding Security.................................. 5

The United States Is in the Regime-Change Business........................................ 7

Are We That Good, or Are They That Bad?.......................................................... 8

Divergence, Not Convergence........................................................................... 10

The Anti-Access Challenge Is Real and Growing.............................................. 11

III.

P
RECISION
W
ARFARE
C
OMES OF
A
GE
........................................................................ 13

New Tools for a New Mission ............................................................................ 13

Air Superiority and Information Advantage....................................................... 14

Compressing the Engagement Cycle ................................................................ 15

Special Operations Forces ................................................................................ 18

Precision Strike ................................................................................................. 19

Joint Integration........................................................................................... 20

The Dawn (and Twilight?) of Shock and Awe ........................................... 21

Friendly Fire.................................................................................................. 23

IV.

T
HE
B
ATTLE OVER THE
L
ESSONS OF
I
RAQ
.................................................................. 25

Low-Density/High-Demand Capabilities............................................................. 25

Persistent Surveillance: UAVs and SOF....................................................... 25

Bombers........................................................................................................ 26

Tankers......................................................................................................... 27

Stability Operations...................................................................................... 27

High-Density, Low-Demand................................................................................ 29

Tactical Aircraft ........................................................................................... 29

Heavy Ground Formations............................................................................ 30

V.

C
ONCLUSION
:

M
EETING TOMORROW S CHALLENGES
.................................................... 33

Familiar Threats................................................................................................. 33

Emerging Challenges ......................................................................................... 34

Unanswered
Questions...................................................................................... 35


i


i
E
XECUTIVE
S
UMMARY

This paper offers a first-blush assessment of the coalition campaign against Saddam Husseins
regime that began on March 19, 2003, and was declared completed by President George W. Bush
on May 1, 2003. Given the lack of comprehensive data on coalition operations and the tentative
nature of much of the data thus far made public, many of the lessons or implications that
follow must be regarded as preliminary. A thorough independent assessment of the conflict is
needed, similar to the Gulf War Air Power Survey commissioned by the US Air Force after
Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, any assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom should focus on
how the experience of this war will influence future military competitions. The following are
among the wars potential implications for US military planners:
S
TRATEGIC
I
MPLICATIONS

The United States Is in the Regime-Change Business
If there ever was any doubt that the United States is in the regime-change business, the Second
Gulf War should dispel it. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has, directly or
indirectly, deposed the regime of a foreign state roughly once every three years. But those who
practice regime change incur certain responsibilities as well as moral and political consequences.
The United States must stabilize Iraq, lest it incur a significant setback in its efforts to make
progress in the war against hostile Islamic regimes and radical Islamic terrorist movements.
Success, however, will likely involve a protracted occupation of Islamic states (i.e., Afghanistan
and Iraq) and exact substantial human and material costs. This means the US militarys
preference to do what it does bestdefeat enemy forces in the field and then quickly depart
must be overcome. The practice of crafting quick exit strategies must yield to a willingness to
develop a comprehensive strategy for winning both the war and the postconflict period that
follows. In short, the American militarythe Army, in particularmust create a significant
capability for conducting stability operations.
Divergence, Not Convergence
Although it comes as no surprise to most military observers, Operation Iraqi Freedom again
demonstrated the wideand expandinggap between the US and all the worlds other militaries
in conventional operations. The implications for those who consider themselves actual or
potential enemies of the United States are clear: they must avoid taking on the American military
in conventional war. Rather, they must move to the extremes along the spectrum of conflict. For
rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, this means acquiring nuclear weapons or pursuing
more ambiguous forms of aggression through support of terrorist organizations. A third option is
to develop anti-access and area-denial capabilities.
The Anti-Access Challenge Is Real and Growing
Operation Iraqi Freedom provided a clear lesson for what has been a growing trend: denying US
access to overseas bases. Moreover, the Bush Administrations increased emphasis on preventive
ii
strike and preventive war could make it even more difficult to secure forward base access.
Foreign governments would be more likely to grant access in response to an act of aggression
than when the United States is contemplating initiating military operations. This fact highlights
the need for the United States to develop and field military forces capable of conducting large-
scale power-projection operations independent of access to forward bases.
P
RECISION
W
ARFARE
C
OMES OF
A
GE

The Second Gulf War found coalition forces in the position of trying to protect the people of Iraq
and the nations infrastructure from the regi