Earthquake Assessment




CONTENTS



Preface


A. Executive Summary
1

Section I: Background and Overview of Marmara Earthquake Zone
8
A. The Earthquake and Initial Emergency Response
8
B. Impressions from Site Visits
9
C. Economic Overview of the Earthquake Zone
10

Section II: Economic Assessment
12
A. Introduction
12
B. Macroeconomic Implications of the Marmara Earthquake
12
C. Impact on the Enterprise and Financial Sectors
25
D. Social Dimension
33

Section III: Preliminary Damage Assessment
39
A. Introduction
39
B. Assessment by Sector
40

Statistical Annex

TURKEY

Marmara Earthquake Assessment

Preface




On August 17, the Marmara Region of Turkey was hit by a massive earthquake.
The World Bank was invited by the Government to help prepare an assessment of the
cost of reconstruction and the impact of the earthquake on the economy. Two World
Bank teams were mobilized very rapidly to assist the Government in this effort.


The Marmara Earthquake Emerge ncy Recovery team began work on August 24
and completed an earthquake damage assessment. The team was comprised of Piotr
Wilczynski (team leader, ECSSD), Nedret Durutan (ECCTR), Catherine Stevens
(ECSSD), Christophe Pusch (ECSSD), Alcira Kreimer (TWURD), Richard Lacroix
(ECSSD), Ralf Schwimmbeck (EMTOG), Dejan Ostojic (ECSEG), Anders Halldin
(ECSSD), Eugene Gurenko (ECSIN), Amy Evans (ECSSD), Michael Mertaugh
(ECSHD), Betty Hanan (ECSHD), Richard Andrews (Consultant), and Sven-Ake
Blomberg (Consultant).

The second team began work on September 1 and completed an earthquake
economic assessment and synthesized the two reports. The team was comprised of
James Parks (Team Leader, ECCTR), Ismail Arslan (Deputy Team Leader, ECCTR),
Abebe Aemro Selassie (IMF), Mark Sundberg (ECSPE), Jeanine Braithwaite
(ECSPE), Tunc Uyanik (ECSFP), Nevin Turk (IFC), Insan Tunali (Consultant),
Mediha Agar (ECCTR) and Pinar Baydar (ECCTR).
Both teams completed their work on September 10. This report, coordinated by
James Parks, presents their findings. The report has been prepared under the overall
guidance of Ajay Chhibber, Country Director.


The World Bank teams worked very closely with government agencies, and
consulted widely with the private sector, non-governmental organizations,
universities, other international agencies. The teams would like to thank the
Undersecretariat of Treasury for coordinating their work.


The findings will need updating as more information becomes available. They
represents our best estimates and conclusions at this point and are made available to
help Government formulate an overall and comprehensive approach to the
reconstruction and recovery from the earthquake.




World Bank
September 14, 1999

TURKEY: Marmara Earthquake Assessment
Turkey: Marmara Earthquake Assessment
A. Executive Summary
1.
On August 17, 1999 an earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale at 3:00
am. devastated the Marmara region of Turkey. Over 15,000 lives have been lost and
there is extensive damage to Turkey's industrial heartland. As the region digs out of
the rubble, it is clear that a major reconstruction effort and recovery plan is needed.
International support for Turkey for the immediate relief effort has been rapid and
generous. As Turkey looks ahead to rehabilitation and reconstruction, substantial
international financing is needed. This preliminary assessment outlines the likely
impact of the earthquake on the economy and the cost of reconstruction and recovery.
It also highlights the key issues that need to be addressed to reduce the costs of future
natural disasters in the country.
2.
Methodological Approach. In assessing the impact of the Marmara
earthquake on the Turkish economy, the Bank's teams have looked at three channels:
(i) direct costs, (ii) indirect costs, and (iii) secondary effects. Direct costs refer to the
physical damage to capital assets and inventories which can be attributed to the actual
impact of the disaster. Indirect costs refer to flow effects including output losses and
foregone earnings as well as the cost of emergency relief efforts. Secondary effects
concern the short and medium-term impact of the disaster on overall economic
performance such as the implications for the fiscal accounts and the balance of
payments. Secondary effects also include the influence on the incidence of poverty as
well as shifts in government policy to respond to the impact of the disaster on the
economy including macroeconomic balances and inflation. While important, the
direct costs do not tell the whole story about the full impact of natural disasters and
say little about the underlying factors which may exacerbate or minimize the
economic effects such as the structure of the economy or the quality of the
Government policy response. Therefore, it is not possible to measure the impact of
natural disasters in terms of a single financial figure.
1

3.
Caveats. In interpreting the teams' findings, it is essential to keep in mind
two factors. First, given the scope of the earthquake and the need to prepare a rapid
assessment, the teams were not able to focus in detail on the impact on all sectors of
the economy nor could they consult with the entire range of public and private
organizations. Therefore, there may be some gaps in the coverage of the assessment.
Furthermore, the data available in the aftermath of the earthquake are preliminary and
incomplete. Many of the key statistics continue to change daily. There are also a
number of important inconsistencies in the data. Under these conditions, the teams
were obliged to make a number of critical assumptions concerning key parameters
which affect the results. Where relevant, these assumptions are made explicit in the
report and further details are given in the Annex. For many key indicators, the teams
have concentrated more on establishing reasonable ranges than on determining point
estimates. In addition, the teams have identified several important areas for follow-up
survey and analytical work.

1
For a more detailed presentation of this methodological approach, see "The Economic Impact of
Natural Disasters in the Philippines", Charlotte Benson, OECD Working Paper 99, June 1997. TURKEY: Marmara Earthquake Assessment Page 2 of 50

4.
Key Findings. The estimated costs of the earthquake are summarized in the
table below. In terms of direct costs, it is very difficult to estimate the total wealth
lost at this stage given the limited information gathered to date. In particular, detailed
survey data of capital and inventory losses in the housing and enterprise sectors are
not yet available. On the basis of the partial data available (see para. 6), the Bank
team estimates a range for the wealth loss of US$3-6.5 billion. (1.5 percent-3.3
percent of GNP). In terms of indirect costs, the Bank team estimates that the
earthquake will reduce GNP in 1999 by 0.6 percent-1.0 percent, equivalent to
US$1.2-2 billion. This estimate assumes that at least part of the output loss in the
affected region will be made up by increased production elsewhere in the economy.
In the year 2000, GNP growth is expected to exceed baseline forecasts by some 1
percent of GNP due primarily to reconstruction activity. This optimistic scenario for
2000 is predicated on substantial external financing for reconstruction costs,
otherwise reconstruction activity may run up against domestic financing constraints.
With regard to secondary effects, the earthquake is estimated to impose an additional
fiscal burden of between US$3.6-4.6 billion spread over the 1999-2000 period
equivalent to 1.8 percent-2.3 percent of GNP. The fiscal costs could rise substantially
if Turkey decides on a major relocation program. The earthquake is projected to
generate a widening of the current account deficit by a total of some US$3 billion
over the 1999-2000 period, equivalent to about 1.5 percent of GNP, largely as a result
of increased economic activity arising from the reconstruction effort. The external
financing of this additional current account deficit is expected to come from long-
term credits and concessional funds provided by international financial organizations
and Turkey's bilateral partners.
5.
The earthquake has had a huge social impact. The fatality rate from the
earthquake is in the range of 14.3 per thousand depending on the affected province.
This is more than five times Turkey's natural annual crude death rate. Injury rates are
also very high and many of the survivors are traumatized by their ordeal. An
estimated 400,000-600,000 people have been left homeless. The Ministry of
Education estimates that about 114,000 school-aged children are homeless as a result
of the earthquake. Employment losses in the affected areas are estimated to range
from 20 percent to nearly 50 percent. Addressing these social costs will impose an
added burden on Turkey's social protection system over the next 16 months. TURKEY: Marmara Earthquake Assessment Page 3 of 50


Table 1: Impact of the Marmara Earthquake: Summary Indicators

6.
Damage Estimates by Sector. Based on the available data it is possible to
estimate roughly u