e: This report has a media release embargo until
4 p.m., Thursday, September 7, 2000. Thank you for your cooperation. Report of the Citizens Panel on WTO Operations
Page 2 of 38
Table of Contents

I.

Introduction................................................................................................................................... 4

II.

Overview of WTO Operational Events........................................................................................... 7

III.

Police Cooperation with the Panels Inquiry...................................................................................12

IV.

Findings & Recommendations .......................................................................................................13
Finding 1: The citys preparations for WTO did not include a plan to deal with the well-publicized
efforts to shut down the WTO.......................................................................................................13
Finding 2: Insufficient numbers of law enforcement officers were available for immediate deployment
on the morning of November 30....................................................................................................16
Finding 3: Large-scale arrests rather than chemical irritants or other less-lethal force should be the
tactic of choice in dealing with unlawful assemblies.........................................................................19
Finding 4: The police failed to take adequate measures to prevent and deter disruption and serious
criminal activity. ............................................................................................................................24
Finding 5: Demonstrators often were not given adequate warnings regarding the use of chemical
irritants and other less-lethal force..................................................................................................26
Finding 6: The events surrounding the WTO do not demonstrate any need to repeal the Seattle
Intelligence Ordinance...................................................................................................................28
Finding 7: City officials should balance public comments about protecting the rights of demonstrators
with appropriate admonitions that criminal behavior will not be tolerated.........................................30
Finding 8: The uniformed police officers deployed on the streets during WTO at times lacked
sufficient visible identification. ........................................................................................................31
Finding 9: In practice, the limited curfew zone was treated by the police as creating a no protest
zone............................................................................................................................................32
Finding 10: Police and fire department commanders failed to adequately resolve disagreements about
the fire departments role in assisting police during the WTO. This failure led to unnecessary conflict
between these two vital public safety agencies................................................................................34
Finding 11: Police actions had the unintended effect of provoking or prolonging disturbances on
Capitol Hill. ..................................................................................................................................36

V.

Conclusion....................................................................................................................................39 Report of the Citizens Panel on WTO Operations
Page 3 of 38 Report of the Citizens Panel on WTO Operations
Page 4 of 38
Introduction
Public demonstrations are a vital part of political life in a democracy, and they inevitably pose
special challenges for law enforcement officials. For participants, demonstrations are often an effective
technique for expressing views on important public issues. Such demonstrations can be particularly vital
if the major parties involved disagree with the demonstrators views or have chosen to ignore them.
Demonstrations involving tens of thousands of participants are especially likely to be effective in
attracting and shaping public opinion, but also pose more difficult problems for the police. Police must
negotiate an often-delicate balance, facilitating the free speech of protesters while simultaneously
safeguarding the rights of those who are not taking part in the protests.
At any demonstration of substantial size, success for participants and police alike requires
an effective partnership between demonstration organizers and law enforcement officials, dealing with
issues ranging from parade routes to pre-arranged arrests. For months before November 1999, a
number of organizers and officials worked together in pursuit of that goal. The vast majority of the
demonstrators wanted only to engage in a peaceful and effective articulation of their objections to the
policies and structure of the WTO. A smaller number intended to engage in non-violent civil
disobedience, expecting, often hoping, to be arrested. On November 29, 1999, neither these
demonstrators nor law enforcement officials harbored any apparent ill will towards one another.
Despite the hopes that animated the original invitation to the WTO Ministerial, and the desires of
the city officials responsible for planning for that meeting and the security surrounding it, the events that
unfolded on November 30 through December 3, 1999 were inimical to the legitimate interests of all the
organizations, groups, and individuals involved.
The efforts of demonstrators to publicize substantive arguments about the WTO and its
policies were to a significant degree drowned out by press coverage of the disruptions that
occurred.
1
In the wake of the events of last fall, groups whose conduct was entirely lawful
and proper have been unfairly criticized as responsible for the disruptions that occurred.
On December 1 through 3 the ability of anti-WTO groups and individuals to protest in a
visible and effective manner was seriously impaired by the imposition of the "limited curfew"
that had the effect of limiting demonstrations in downtown Seattle.
Several important WTO meetings had to be cancelled on November 30 because of the
serious disruptions occurring in the streets. A number of delegates were threatened, and in


1
Seattle Times, December 1, 1999, "Vandals Destroy Message of March"; Seattle Weekly, December 9-15, 1999,
Anarchists, go home! ("All sides calculated, correctly, that even the breaking of a few windows would overcome
months worth of organizing work and the concerted effort of thousands of people in the media, and public eye. . .
.Possibly the most significant mass action Ill ever see was a lot less effective in its global message than it could have
been thanks to a few dozen people."); Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 2, 1999, After violence comes the
cleanup("Leaders of non-violent protest groups yesterday expressed frustration that their successful actions were
eclipsed by the violence of a few").
On November 15, 1999, Mike Dolan of Public Citizen forwarded to the mayors office an email written by
Mark Sommer that warns that Even if the great majority of protesters are responsible and self-disciplined, the media
will be drawn to those few malcontents who may know nothing about the issues but are attracted to the spotlight to
express their inchoate anger at the world. Report of the Citizens Panel on WTO Operations
Page 5 of 38
a few instances assaulted.
Demonstrators, bystanders and police officers were injured during the disturbances. The
difficult circumstances engendered, among all parties, fear and anger that was avoidable.
Downtown businesses sustained several million dollars in damages, both from property
destruction and from lost sales.
The cooperative relationship between the police and members of the public was impaired.
The purposes of this report are to identify those plans and actions by city officials and by
demonstrators that played the most important role in bringing about these problems, and to make
recommendations that will hopefully avoid repetition of these problems in the future.
We believe that efforts to single out particular city officials for blame would be
counterproductive. There are major public policy questions at issue here. Even the most talented and
well-intentioned city officials will repeat the mistakes of WTO if these questions are not well understood
and correctly addressed.
A significant number of disputes have arisen about what occurred during particular incidents
during the WTO. Many of these involve assertions that individual police officers used excessive force.
The mandate of this panel did not include resolving such disputes, and we have not attempted to do so.
Our inquiry, including interviews, revealed that in some instances there are sharply conflicting accounts
from individuals who were present; in other cases the identity of one or more of the participants remains
unknown. A number of these incidents are the subject of civil litigation. The courts are the appropriate
forums for making the relevant factual determinations regarding such specific disputes. Although the
accurate resolution of these disputes is important, an overall assessment of the WTO should not be
delayed until the final determination of that litigation.
Many of the assertions of excessive police force concern either police department policies or
specific tactical decisions made during the WTO by police